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Introduction
The need for a fi nancial transaction tax (FTT) 
has been attracting more attention because 
of the fi nancial crisis in 2008, although ideas 
about introducing a new tax on fi nancial sector 
have been debated at various times over the 
last thirty years. Due to the crisis’ different 
effects on different countries, consensus has 
not yet been achieved, although Keynes (1936) 
proposed a FTT for the stock market and Tobin 
(1978; 1996) recommended a FTT for the 
foreign-exchange market. Schulmeister et al. 
(2008) describe a general FTT, Keen (2011) 
explores the possible purposes and broad 
design of distinctive tax measures for fi nancial 
institutions, focusing especially on the potential 
role of corrective taxation. Next, Schulmeister 
(2014) outlines reasons to introduce a FTT. 
First, the economic crisis was deepened by 
the instability of stock prices, exchange rates 
and commodity prices. This instability might 
be dampened by such a tax. Second, as 
a consequence of the crisis, the need for fi scal 
consolidation has increased substantially. 
A FTT would provide governments with 
substantial revenues. Third, the dampening 
effects of a FTT on the real economy would be 
much smaller than other tax measures such as 
increasing the VAT. Szarowská (2014) notes 
that the main expectation is that a new FTT 
could dissuade harmful speculation by fi nancial 
markets and that its revenues would appear 
to be a fair way of recovering the costs of the 
crisis. 
On the other hand, Shackelford et al. 
(2010) and Rieger (2014) present opponents’ 
arguments, such that the high trading volume 
observable in fi nancial markets does not 
cause price volatility and is in fact a stabilizing 
infl uence. He argues that the introduction of 
a FTT would lower liquidity; as a result, trades 
would have a larger impact on prices, which, 
in turn, would increase volatility. Thus, from 
the point of view of opponents, a FTT could 
destabilize fi nancial markets.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the 
impact of FTTs on the stability of the fi nancial 
market. Because FTTs may be defi ned in 
different ways, assets are defi ned as tax objects 
in this paper. We use the model developed 
by Westerhoff (2009) but extended it to FTTs 
and consequential transaction-cost infl uences. 
An agent-based model was implemented 
and managed as a simulation in the netLogo 
development platform to provide the research 
basis for simulation experiments. In the model, 
virtual market participants in the form of 
intelligent agents traded one type of asset. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 
1 briefl y summarizes the main facts about 
FTTs and its relationship with transaction costs 
and fi nancial sector stability while introducing 
the agent-based methods for modeling and 
simulation. Section 2 presents the original 
agent-based model and its extension. Section 3 
presents the simulation results.
1. Theoretical Background
This section introduces a short literature review 
and the theoretical basis for the concepts used 
in this paper.
1.1 Financial Transaction Taxation
The transaction costs for fi nancial markets 
are mainly the costs of obtaining and 
interpreting information, the time required 
to make decisions, as well as various types 
of fees, etc. Transaction costs, according to 
Burian (2010), are often viewed as negative 
phenomena, but there are cases in which 
increases in transaction costs can be viewed 
positively and contribute to the stability of the 
market. Increases in transaction costs may 
also occur in the form of non-market regulation 
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such as taxes. Tobin (1978) suggested that all 
short-term transactions in foreign-exchange 
markets should be taxed at a low fi xed rate (the 
proposal was later identifi ed as the so-called 
Tobin tax) because currency speculation can 
lead to the sudden withdrawal of currencies 
from circulation to artifi cially increase prices. 
The results, according to Tobin, would avoid 
short-term currency speculation and stabilize 
the market.
The question of whether new taxes should 
be levied on the fi nancial sector to complement 
regulations and bank levies has been a topic 
since the beginning of the economic crisis. 
Generally, the concept of FTTs is based on the 
application of a tax to all fi nancial transactions, 
in particular, those carried out in organized 
markets, such as the trade of equity, bonds, 
derivatives, currencies, etc. It would be levied 
at a relatively low statutory rate and would apply 
each time the underlying asset was traded. The 
tax collection or the legal tax incidence occurs – 
as far as possible – via the trading system that 
executes the transfer.
Although the FTT is connected to and 
understood as a Tobin tax in most cases, 
several different tax instruments are generally 
referred to as “fi nancial transaction taxes.” 
Matheson (2011) defi nes a securities 
transaction tax (STT) as a tax on trades in all 
or certain types of securities (equity, debt and 
their derivatives). A currency transaction tax 
(CTT) is a securities transaction tax imposed 
specifi cally on foreign exchange transactions 
and possibly also their derivatives: currency 
futures, options and swaps. It is often used 
as pecuniary foreign exchange control in lieu 
of administrative and regulatory measures. 
A capital levy or registration tax is imposed 
on increases in business capital in the form 
of capital contributions, loans and/or issuance 
of stocks and bonds. The registration tax may 
encompass all forms of business capital or be 
limited to a particular type of capital (e.g. debt or 
equity) or form of business, such as corporations 
or partnerships. A registration tax may also 
be charged to individuals on bank loans and/
or mortgages. A bank transaction tax (BTT) 
is a tax on deposits and/or withdrawals from 
bank accounts. Most commonly seen in Latin 
American and Asia, BTTs are usually imposed 
on an ad valorem basis as a percentage of 
the deposit or withdrawal. BTTs effectively tax 
purchases of goods and services, investment 
products and factor payments paid for with 
funds intermediated by banks. Shaviro (2012) 
summarizes the history of the FTT.
The motivation for the FTT is based on 
two claims about the tax. First, it improves the 
functioning of fi nancial markets through curbing 
harmful short-term speculation and reducing 
volatility by making it less profi table. Second, 
it raises signifi cant amounts of revenue even 
if the tax rate is very low (for details look at 
Nerudová and Dvořáková (2014)).
As was already noted, there are several types 
of FTTs, and each has its own purpose. Some 
FTT types have already been implemented, 
whereas some are still only proposals. Griffi th-
Jones and Persaud (2012) state that 40 
countries had FTTs in operation, raising $38 
billion (€29bn) in 2011. Other arguments for 
their adoption include progressivity and ease of 
implementation. However, as Matheson (2011) 
notes, experiences regarding revenue from 
securities transaction taxes over the past two 
decades have varied widely.
There is currently a growing number of 
empirical studies analyzing the possibility of 
using FTTs to regulate the fi nancial market and 
enhance fi nancial sector stability. In line with the 
European Commission´s expectation (2010), 
FTTs should heighten the effi ciency and stability 
of fi nancial markets and reduce their volatility, 
as well as the harmful effects of excessive risk-
taking, which can create negative externalities 
for the rest of the economy. Unfortunately, 
Habermeier and Kirilenko (2001) conclude 
that in most circumstances, transaction taxes 
or their equivalents, such as capital controls, 
can have negative effects on price discovery, 
volatility, and liquidity, and lead to a reduction in 
market effi ciency.
Phylaktis and Aristidou (2007) examine the 
effects of security transaction taxes on volatility. 
Tab. 1 shows the results of earlier empirical 
studies based on different market samples and 
periods. The authors focus on whether the tax 
has a greater effect on highly traded stocks 
because it penalizes entering and exiting the 
market, and whether the effect depends on the 
state of the stock market. Their results highlight 
that effects are stronger during bull periods 
and for highly traded stocks, but that volatility 
increases instead of decreases, as intended by 
the proponents of transaction taxes.
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Schäfer (2012) argues that FTTs 
complement fi nancial market regulation. 
With FTTs, governments have an additional 
instrument for infl uencing trading activity. FTTs 
can reduce regulatory arbitrage, fl ash trading, 
overactive portfolio management, excessive 
leverage and speculative transactions of 
fi nancial institutions. If, contrary to expectations, 
harmful transactions will not be curbed, FTTs at 
least generate large tax revenues that can help 
cover the costs of a fi nancial crisis.
Rieger (2014) studies the impact of 
a fi nancial transaction tax on trading volume 
and asset price volatility in a model with 
heterogeneous beliefs. He studies a tax on bond 
and asset purchases. The simulated model 
shows that the introduction of a transaction tax 
results in a lower trading volume and thereby 
less liquid fi nancial markets because of the 
decreased liquidity and increased volatility of 
the stock market.
Schulmeister (2014 and 2015) and 
DeMooij and Nicodeme (2014) summarize the 
main arguments in favor of and against FTTs 
and provides empirical evidence about the 
movements of the most important asset prices. 
He shows that their long swings result from 
the accumulation of extremely short-term price 
runs over time. Therefore, a (very) small FTT – 
between 0.1 and 0.01 percent – would mitigate 
price volatility not only over the short-run but 
also over the long run. Next, he combines 
empirical results with an analysis of technical 
trading systems and formulates a hypothesis 
about trading behavior and asset price dynamics 
(the “Bull-Bear-Hypothesis”). On the one hand, 
asset trading has become progressively more 
short-term-oriented (“faster“); on the other 
hand, the phenomenon of long-term trends 
(“bulls” and “bears”) has also become more 
pronounced. This coincidence can be explained 
by the fact that long-term trends are the results 
of the accumulation of very short-term price 
runs that are exploited and strengthened by 
the use of ever “faster” trading systems. The 
results of his research suggest that the FTT 
should be levied on all transactions of any 
type of fi nancial asset. The “faster” an asset is 
traded and the riskier it is, the more will the FTT 
increase transactions costs. At the same time, 
holding a fi nancial asset will not be burdened by 
the FTT. Hence, an FTT with a uniform rate will 
specifi cally dampen very short-term speculation 
in derivatives because the effective tax burden 
relative to the cash (margin) requirement 
increases with the leverage factor.
Finally, Szołno-Koguc and Twarowska 
(2014) contest the hypothesis that FTTs reduce 
the scale of market speculation, which is not 
confi rmed by the results of empirical studies. 
To prove this hypothesis, the proponents of the 
tax carry out simulations based on econometric 
models. Regardless of the testing method, 
the analytical results are inconclusive. These 
doubts concern not only whether FTTs affect the 
scale of market speculation and price volatility 
of fi nancial instruments but also whether the 
impact is positive or negative.
1.2 Agents and Agent-Based 
Models
The roots of this research lay in computational 
social science, which involves the use of agent-
based modeling and simulation (ABMS) to study 
complex social systems (Kaegi, 2009; Epstein 
& Axtell, 1996). ABMS is a core technique used 
Author Sample (Market) Sign of Effect
Roll (1989) 23 countries Zero
Umlauf (1993) Sweden Positive
Jones and Seguin (1997) U.S.A. Positive 
Saporta and Kan (1997) United Kingdom Zero
Hu (1998) Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Taiwan Zero
Green, Maggioni and Murinde (2000) United Kingdom Positive
Hau (2003) France Positive
Source: Phylaktis and Aristidou (2007)
Tab. 1: Volatility effects of transaction taxes
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by this paper to study fi nancial system. ABMS 
consists of a set of agents and a framework 
for simulating their decisions and interactions. 
Although the ABMS shares many traits with 
other models, the ABMS is differentiated by its 
focus on fi nding the set of basic decision rules 
and behavioral interactions that can produce 
the complex results experienced in the real 
world (Sallach & Macal, 2001). ABMS tools are 
designed to simulate the interactions of large 
numbers of individuals to study the macro-scale 
consequences of these interactions (Tesfatsion, 
2001).
The intelligent agent technology used in this 
paper has a long history in economic theory, 
mainly in the ideas of Hayek (1949) and Simon 
(1955). Hayek (1949) claims that the economic 
system should be studied from the bottom. He 
stresses the need to look at the market economy 
as a decentralized system that consists of 
mutually infl uencing individuals (the same goes 
for fi nancial markets). This approach contrasts 
with the assumption of perfect information, 
which is used in traditional equilibrium analysis. 
In the theory of complex systems, where ABMS 
belongs, this idea is the primary principle (Macal 
& North, 2006). Agents, unlike in a classical 
equilibrium approach, do not have perfect 
information about all processes in the system.
The market participants in multi-agent 
models use technical and fundamental analysis 
to assess fi nancial markets. Multi-agent 
fi nancial market models have strong empirical 
foundations. This paper uses and extends the 
original model developed by Westerhoff (2009), 
combining the basics from three known agent-
based fi nancial market models.
In the fi rst model, Brock (1997 and 1998) 
chooses a continuum of fi nancial market 
participants endogenously between different 
trading rules. The agents are rational in the 
sense that they tend to pick trading rules 
that have performed well in the recent past, 
thereby displaying some kind of learning in their 
behavior. The performance of trading rules is 
measured as a weighted average of previously 
realized profi ts, and the relative importance of 
the trading rules is derived via a discrete choice 
model. Contributions developed in this manner 
are often analytically tractable. Moreover, 
numerical investigations reveal that complex 
endogenous dynamics may emerge due to 
an ongoing evolutionary competition between 
trading rules. In such a setting, agents interact 
only indirectly with one another: their orders 
have an impact on price formation, which, in 
turn, affects the performance of trading rules 
and agents’ selection of rules. Put differently, 
agents are not directly affected by the actions 
of others.
Kirman (1991; 1993) introduces an infl uential 
opinion formation model with interactions 
between a fi xed numbers of agents. Agents may 
hold one of two views. At each moment in time, 
two agents may meet at random and there is 
a fi xed probability that one agent may convince 
the other agent to adopt his opinion. In addition, 
there is also a small probability that an agent will 
change his opinion independently. A key fi nding 
of this model is that direct interactions between 
heterogeneous agents may lead to substantial 
opinion swings. Applied to a fi nancial market 
setting, one may therefore observe periods in 
which either destabilizing technical traders or 
stabilizing fundamental traders drive the market 
dynamics. Agents may change rules due to 
direct interactions with other agents but the 
switching probabilities are independent of the 
performance of the rules.
The models of Lux (1998) and Lux and 
Marchesi (1999) also focus on the case 
of a limited number of agents. Within this 
approach, an agent may either be an optimistic 
or a pessimistic technical trader or fundamental 
trader. The probability that agents switch 
from having an optimistic technical attitude to 
a pessimistic one (and vice versa) depends on 
the majority opinion among the technical traders 
and the current price trend. For instance, if the 
majority of technical traders are optimistic and 
if prices are increasing, the probability that 
pessimistic technical traders turn into optimistic 
technical traders is relatively high. The 
probability that technical traders (either being 
optimistic or pessimistic) switch to fundamental 
trading (and vice versa) depends on the relative 
profi tability of the rules. However, a comparison 
of the performance of the trading rules is 
modeled in an asymmetric manner. Although 
the attractiveness of technical analysis 
depends on realized profi ts, the popularity of 
fundamental analysis is a result of expected 
future profi t opportunities. This class of models 
is quite effective at replicating several universal 
features of asset price dynamics.
Westerhoff´s (2009) model combines 
key ingredients of the three aforementioned 
approaches to build a simple model that is 
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able to reproduce the stylized facts of fi nancial 
markets. Direct interactions between a numbers 
of agents are considered. To avoid asymmetric 
profi t measures, he defi nes a fi tness function. 
The attractiveness of a rule is approximated by 
a weighted average of current and past myopic 
profi ts.
2. Methodology
Simulating fi nancial markets is a new, quickly 
growing research area with two primary 
motivations. The fi rst motivation is the need to 
provide a development platform for the ever-
increasing automation of fi nancial markets. 
The second is the inability of traditional 
computational mathematics to predict market 
patterns that result from the choices made by 
interacting investors in a market.
The agent-based model simulating the 
fi nancial market developed by Westerhoff (2009) 
was chosen for the implementation. Two base 
types of traders are represented by agents:
 Fundamental traders, whose reactions 
are based on the fundamental analysis. 
They believe that asset prices in long term 
approximate their fundamental price. They 
buy assets when the price is under the 
fundamental value.
 Technical traders, who decide using 
technical analysis. They believe that 
prices tend to move in trends and by their 
extrapolating there comes the positive 
feedback, which can cause the instability.
Price changes refl ect current excesses 
of demand. These excesses express the 
amount of orders submitted by technical 
and fundamental traders each turn and the 
rate between their orders evolves over time. 
Agents regularly meet and discuss their trading 
performance. One agent can be persuaded 
by the other to change its trading method if 
the initial method’s rules are less successful 
than the other’s. Communication is a direct 
conversation between one agent and others. 
The agents meet randomly and there is 
no special relationship between them. The 
success of rules is represented by a current 
and past profi tability. To emphasize this, the 
model assumes the ability of traders to defi ne 
the fundamental value of assets and their 
rational behavior.
The price refl ects the relationship between 
assets that have been bought and sold in a turn 
(trading period), and the price change caused 
by these orders. This can be formalized as 
a simple log-linear price impact function:
 (1)
where a is a coeffi cient of a positive price change, 
DC are the orders generated by technical agents, 
and DF are the orders of fundamental traders. 
WC and WF are weights of agents using the 
technical and fundamental rules, respectively. 
The weights refl ect the current ratio between 
the technical and fundamental agents. The α 
coeffi cient brings randomness to Equation 1 
because the model is a single representation 
of a real fi nancial market. It is an independently 
distributed random variable with a zero average 
and a constant standard deviation σα.
As mentioned earlier, the technical 
analysis extrapolates the price trends, which 
means when prices grow, trading agents buy 
the assets. As a result, the formalization for 
technical order rules can be:
 (2)
The reaction parameter b has a positive 
infl uence and represents the agent’s sensitivity 
to price changes. The difference in brackets 
refl ects the trend and β is a parameter from 
the normal distribution with a zero average and 
a constant standard deviation σβ.
The theory of fundamental analysis argues 
that asset prices can differ from the fundamental 
price in the short term. However, the theory 
assumes that asset prices converge to the 
fundamental value in the long run. Because 
the fundamental analysis suggests buying 
(or selling) assets when the actual prices are 
under (or above) the fundamental value, the 
fundamental business rules can be formalized 
as follows:
 (3)
where c is the parameter of a positive reaction 
and the parameter F is a fundamental value. In 
our case, we keep this value constant to simplify 
the implementation as much as possible (In 
our implementation, F = 0). Parameter γ is 
a random variable with a normal distribution, 
a zero average and a constant standard 
deviation σγ.
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If we say that N is a total number of agents 
and K is a number of technical traders, then we 
defi ne the weight of technical traders as follows:
 (4)
And the weight of fundamental traders as:
 (5)
The number of technical and fundamental 
traders is set out as follows. As in Kirman’s 
(1991; 1993) models, two traders randomly 
meet at each point in time. The probability that 
the fi rst trader adopts the view of the second 
trader is (1-δ). In addition, there is a small 
probability ε that the trader changes his mind 
independently of the others. Contrary to Kirman 
(1991; 1993), we say that the probability of 
a trader changing views is asymmetric and 
depends on the current and past profi tability of 
the rules. This is indicated by the attractiveness 
variables AC and AF, which are defi ned later. 
The assumption is that the technical trading 
rules generated higher profi ts in the past than 
the rules used by fundamental traders. It is 
therefore more likely that a technical trader will 
persuade a fundamental trader than vice versa. 
Likewise, when the fundamental rules are more 
profi table than the technical rules, the chance 
of a successful meeting of a fundamental 
trader with a technical trader becomes higher. 
Therefore, we defi ne the probability K as 
follows:
 
(6)
where the probability that a fundamental agent 
becomes a technical one is:
 (7)
and the probability that a technical agent 
becomes a fundamental one is:
 
(8)
A success (fi tness of the rule) is represented 
by the past profi tability of rules, which are 
formalized as:
 (9)
for the technical rules, and:
 (10)
for the fundamental rules. Agents use the 
most recent performance (at the end of the 
AC formula with respect to AF). The orders 
submitted in a t-2 period are executed at the 
prices started in the t-1 period. The profi ts are 
calculated accordingly. Agents have memory, 
which is represented by the d parameter (0 ≤ 
d ≤ 1). If d = 0, then the agent has no memory. 
With higher values for the d parameter, the 
infl uence of profi ts on the rule fi tness rises.
The stability of fi nancial markets is measured 
by price volatility (the stable the market is, the 
smaller are price differences are at a given 
time). The entrance of transaction costs in the 
form of FTTs will have direct effects on asset 
prices. The original model was changed to 
include this aspect into the calculated price. 
 (11)
where FTT is a value of the transaction costs, 
which are constant during the simulation 
experiments. Because the tax is an out-of-trade 
factor, all agents will be affected in the same 
way. In general, there can be other transaction 
costs besides taxes (e.g., the costs of obtaining 
the information). We expect that increases in 
FTTs should have the following results:
 Price increases will stimulate the usage 
of technical rules. Their infl uence on 
expected future profi t opportunities (as the 
fundamental value of the asset) is irrelevant. 
They depend on the state of the company 
rather than transaction costs.
 In a short time, price increases will attract 
technical traders. However, after the 
realization of profi ts, prices will decrease and 
fundamental traders will start to dominate. 
This will lead to market stabilization (price 
volatility will be lower).
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3. Results and Discussion
On the basis of Westerhoff’s model (2009) 
an agent-based model was implemented 
and managed as a simulation in netLogo 
development platform to provide the research 
basis for simulation experiments. Virtual market 
participants trade with one type of asset and 
are involved in the model as intelligent agents. 
Agents follow technical and fundamental trading 
rules to determine their speculative investment 
positions. We consider direct interactions 
between speculators, due to which they may 
decide to change their trading behavior (Šperka 
& Spišák, 2012; Šperka & Spišák, 2013). To be 
more accurate, 20 simulations were processed. 
The averaged values are plotted in graphs 
below.
3.1 Original Model Results
The model was parameterized using the original 
parameterization from Westerhoff (2009). 
Nevertheless, the number of agents (N) was 
set to 10.000 to obtain more relevant results. 
The parameters are:
 
(12)
With these parameters, the model is 
calibrated to the daily data. The number of turns 
with respect to periods of time is 5,000 days, 
which presents more than 13.5 years. Westerhoff 
(2009) found that increases in the number of 
agents reduced the model’s dynamicity and price 
volatility, whereas agents’ behavior tended to be 
fundamental. This can be reduced by adding 
more communication turns. We decided to give 
1% of agents the opportunity to talk, which had 
a positive infl uence on the model’s dynamicity.
Price values are on the top left of fi gures 
1, 2 and 3. The top-right graph represents 
changes in asset prices at a given point in 
time. The bottom-left graph shows the weights 
of technical trading rules (in the long run, 
there is a tendency to prefer fundamental to 
technical trading rules in fi gure 1). The bottom-
right graph includes the distribution of returns 
(which are log price changes) compared with 
the normal distribution. In fi gure 1, the asset 
prices oscillate over a narrow interval, as does 
Fig. 1: Simulation results – original model
Source: own
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volatility. The distribution of returns follows the 
normal distribution curve almost perfectly. This 
situation is similar to the real fi nancial market as 
it currently appears.
3.2 Extended Model Results
In a new set of simulation experiments, all 
parameters remained the same, except for 
newly added FTT costs. The FTT parameter is 
a constant value equal to 0.015. One can see 
from the following graphs in fi gure 2 that FTT 
costs have a signifi cant infl uence on the model. 
The price grows in the short run, but in the long 
run, it decreases. The technical weight evolution 
is similar. As one can see from the results, the 
price grows in the short run, but after some 
time, it starts to decline. The reason for this 
reaction is that agents prefer the fundamental 
strategy at this point. The market stabilizes with 
more fundamental traders.
We achieved different results with the last 
set of simulations. All the parameters remained 
the same, except for the FTT, which was 
doubled, and the constant, which was set equal 
to 0.03. The higher value of FTT caused the 
model to become destabilized. Technical trader 
rules won in this case (weight = 1) and the price 
increased without limit. Figure 3 demonstrates 
the contradictory effect on the market; instead 
of stabilizing, the market become unstable.
These results correspond with the European 
Commission’s (2010), whose proposal 
considered FTT values at a low rate. Our 
conclusions are in line with Szołno-Koguc and 
Twarowska (2014), who highlight the importance 
of selection methodology and data samples for 
analytical results. This choice determines not 
only whether a FTT affects the scale of market 
speculation and the price volatility of fi nancial 
instruments but also whether the impact is 
positive or negative. Although Habermeier 
and Kirilenko (2001) present negative effects 
on price discovery, volatility and liquidity, 
they do not specify a transaction tax rate, so 
their conclusions agree with our conclusions 
about high values of FTT & consequent costs. 
Phylaktis & Aristidou (2007) refer to many 
studies (e.g. Umlauf, 1993; Jones & Seguin, 
Fig. 2: Simulation results – FTT (0.015)
Source: own
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1997; Green et al., 2000 or Hau, 2003) that report 
the positive volatility effects of transaction taxes, 
which support our conclusions. This variety of 
conclusions is generated by the differences 
used in econometric models, country samples, 
observation periods and variables. It must be 
emphasized that most researchers have used 
ex-post data (Phylaktis & Aristidou, 2007; 
Schulmeister, 2014; 2015; Rieger, 2014), but 
this study has used a general agent-based 
approach.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to investigate the 
impact of a FTT on the stability of the fi nancial 
market. Because FTTs may be defi ned in various 
ways, this paper defi nes assets as tax objects. 
The agent-based fi nancial model designed 
by Westerhoff (2009) was implemented and 
extended by a FTT and rising transaction costs. 
The model includes direct interactions between 
speculators, which may lead them to decide to 
change their trading behavior, and addresses 
the technical and fundamental strategies of 
market participants.
Our extended model has a tendency to 
stabilize itself in a long term if the fundamental 
trading rules outweigh the technical trading 
method thanks to the introduction of FTTs. 
This could be used when bubbles and crashes 
occur in fi nancial markets. Asset prices would 
be stabilized because their value targets are 
near the fundamental value. The volatility 
would also be minimized. Introducing a low 
FTT rate makes asset price rises to a bubble 
while technical traders take over the market. 
However, prices start to fall after some time 
in accordance with the growth of a technical 
strategy. At that moment, volatility minimizes 
and the market stabilizes. Different results are 
achieved with a higher rate of FTT. If FTT and 
consequent costs are too high, the fi nancial 
system destabilizes and the price grows without 
limit.
The model described in this paper explores 
dependence market stability to the extent 
of FTTs. However, the model should not be 
interpreted as a model only for the introduction 
of FTT, but as a general model of transaction 
costs’ infl uence on the fi nancial market.
Fig. 3: Simulation results – FTT (0.03)
Source: own
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Abstract
FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAXATION IN AGENT-BASED SIMULATION 
Roman Šperka, Irena Szarowská
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of fi nancial transaction taxes (FTTs) on the stability 
of fi nancial markets. This paper presents an agent-based fi nancial market model and simulations 
in which agents follow technical and fundamental trading rules to determine their speculative 
investment positions. The model developed by Westerhoff (2009) was chosen for implementation 
and was extended by FTT and arising transaction costs. Because FTTs may be defi ned in various 
ways, this paper defi nes assets as tax objects. The model includes direct interactions between 
speculators, which may lead them to decide to change their trading behavior and addresses 
a technical and a fundamental strategy of market participants. The results suggest that the modifi ed 
model has a tendency to stabilize itself in the long term if fundamental trading rules outweigh the 
technical trading method. This model could be used when bubbles and crashes occur in fi nancial 
markets. Asset prices would be stabilized because their value targets near the fundamental value 
and volatility would also be minimized. Setting FTTs at a low rate for market stabilization is important. 
If FTTs and consequent transaction costs are too high, then the fi nancial system will destabilize 
and prices will grow without limit. The model described in this paper explores dependence market 
stability to the extent of FTTs. However, the model should not be interpreted as a model only for the 
introduction of FTT, but as a general model of transaction costs’ infl uence on the fi nancial market.
Key Words: Financial transaction tax, agent-based model, technical and fundamental analysis, 
simulation.
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